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John V Orth*

TERMINATION OF TENANCY IN COMMON
BY ADVERSE POSSESSION: A COMPARATIVE
LESSON FROM THE UNITED STATES
I I ntroduction

T

he common law recognised four types of co-ownership: joint tenancy, tenancy
in common, coparcenary, and tenancy by the entireties. Of these, only the
joint tenancy and the tenancy in common retain relevance in Australian law.1
And of those, the tenancy in common is the simplest: tenants in common share
possession, but otherwise each cotenant’s interest, although undivided, is alienable,
devisable, and inheritable. Unlike joint tenancy, tenancy in common provides no
right of survivorship, and there is no requirement that the cotenants’ shares be equal.
Notwithstanding the simplicity of the estate, tenancy in common can cause some of
the trickiest problems in one particular instance: the operation of the law of adverse
possession.

In American law, adverse possession continues generally to operate according to
common law principles.2 It is a common assumption that in Australian law the
operation of Torrens title, and especially the concept of indefeasibility, obviates the
operation of adverse possession.3 That misunderstands the Australian position. In
fact, while it is true that adverse possession fundamentally undermines the operation
of a system of title by registration, every Australian state nonetheless recognises
circumstances in which an adverse possessor may still acquire either an enforceable
interest or title to land over a registered owner with indefeasible title.4 The strength of
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JD (Harvard, 1974); PhD (Harvard, 1977); William Rand Kenan, Jr Professor of Law,
University of North Carolina. Parts of this article draw upon Paul Babie, ‘The Crown
and Possessory Title of Torrens Land in South Australia’ (2016) 6(1) Property Law
Review 46; Paul Babie and John Orth, ‘The Troubled Borderlands of Torrens Indefeasibility: Lessons from Australia and the United States’ (2017) 7(1) Property Law
Review 33. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Professor Paul Babie
with the Australian authorities.
Anthony P Moore, Scott Grattan and Lynden Griggs, Bradbrook, MacCallum and
Moore’s Australian Real Property Law (Lawbook, 6th ed, 2016) 562–3.
See John Lovett, ‘Disseisin, Doubt, and Debate: Adverse Possession Scholarship in
the United States (1881–1986)’ (2017) 5(1) Texas A&M Law Review 1.
See Lynden Griggs, ‘Possessory Titles in a System of Titles by Registration’ (1999)
21(2) Adelaide Law Review 157. Griggs argues that titles based upon possession are
inconsistent with a system of title by registration.
Moore, Grattan and Griggs (n 1) 122–3.
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such a claim, however, varies significantly across different Australian jurisdictions.5
In Victoria and Western Australia, for instance, and to some extent in Tasmania, the
‘acquisition of title by possession applies fully to Torrens land’.6 In Queensland, the
legislation also recognises adverse possession as an exception to indefeasibility of
title, but only where the adverse possessor can demonstrate they have been in adverse
possession of the land for the requisite statutory period.7 In New South Wales, the
legislation provides that an adverse possessor may only make a claim to acquire
title against a registered title to land to the Registrar-General where ‘the title of the
registered proprietor would … have been extinguished’ under the limitation statute
and the application is made in respect of a ‘whole parcel of land’.8 And in South
Australia, subject to legislative conditions,9 title by adverse possession can only be
obtained over Torrens land where a person who would have extinguished the title of
the true owner of the land, would have done so if the land had been held under the
general law.10 The South Australian provisions
strike a balance between absolutely securing the title to a person’s estate or interest
and the competing principle that public interest demands that if a person chooses
to abandon those rights for a long period of time there should be a method of
clearing the title to the land so that it can be utilised for public benefit.11

Australian Torrens title legislation seems therefore to allow the cutting short of an
otherwise indefeasible title through satisfying the conditions of adverse possession.
But what about a tenant in common? Typically, because all cotenants have an equal
right to possession, the possession of one cotenant is not considered adverse to the
rights of other cotenants: ‘[i]n the absence of wrongful exclusion and of statutory
intervention, possession by one co-owner for any period of time would not bar the
right and title of the co-owners out of possession’.12 To start the running of the
limitation period on which the doctrine of adverse possession is based, a cotenant
who claims more than the cotenant’s share must oust, or wrongfully exclude, the
other cotenants. A recent case decided by the Supreme Court of Montana addressed
the question of whether a deed (in Torrens, the registration of a transfer) by less than
all cotenants purporting to convey the entire estate to a third party constitutes ouster
or wrongful exclusion and begins the running of the limitation period. This remains
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Ibid 122–3, 178–85.
Ibid 179–81. See also Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) ss 42(2)(b), 60–2; Transfer of
Land Act 1893 (WA) ss 68(1A), 222–223A; Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas) ss 40(3)(h),
138T–138Y.
Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) pt 6 div 5, s 185(1)(d), sch 2 (definition of ‘adverse
possessor’); Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) s 13.
Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) s 45D(1).
Real Property Act 1886 (SA) ss 80A–80I, 251.
Ibid s 80A.
Douglas J Whalan, The Torrens System in Australia (Lawbook, 1982) 328.
Moore, Grattan and Griggs (n 1) 161.
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an open question in both Australian and American law, and so the case provides
important guidance for both jurisdictions.13

II T he F actual B ackground
The chain of events that resulted in the lawsuit began in 1987 when Rose Bisceglia
died intestate. The one-half interest in certain real property that she owned at death
passed in equal shares to her husband George Salituro and her daughter by a prior
marriage, Josephine Palese. Angelo Bisceglia, Rose’s brother and the owner of the
other one-half interest in the property, recorded an affidavit of heirship in the county
property records which listed Rose’s surviving child Josephine, but did not include
Rose’s surviving husband George.14 According to the record, neither Angelo nor
Josephine realised that George took an interest in Rose’s property by intestate succession.15 In 1988, Josephine and Angelo16 executed a deed purporting to convey
the entire estate to Josephine’s two children, Mary Jo Davis and Anthony Palese.17
From 1988 to 1997, Mary Jo and Anthony paid all the property taxes and executed
leases for grazing and farming. In 1997, they sold the property to Mark Nelson and
Jo Marie Nelson (‘the Nelsons’),18 reserving to themselves an undivided one-half
interest in ‘oil, gas, and other minerals in and under’ the property.19
From 2006, the Nelsons began leasing the property for oil and gas development.
A subsequent title examination discovered the overlooked one-quarter interest that
had passed to George on the death of his wife, Rose. George died intestate in 1991
and his one-quarter interest passed in equal shares to his two children by a prior
marriage, George Salituro Jr and Rose Salituro (‘the Salituros’).

III T he D ecision

of the

M ontana S upreme C ourt

The present action began when the Nelsons filed a quiet title action against Mary Jo
and Anthony, their grantors and claimants of a one-half interest in the mineral estate,
13
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15
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19

Nelson v Davis, 417 P 3d 333 (Mont, 2018) (‘Nelson’).
The judgment indicates that there were no intestacy proceedings, so it is unclear
in what capacity Angelo was acting when he filed the affidavit of heirship, nor is it
explained why George took no part in settling his wife’s estate.
Nelson (n 13) 335–6.
Josephine and Angelo were joined in the deed by their respective spouses, presumably
to waive any spousal survival rights: ibid 336.
The opinion does not mention whether the deed to Mary Jo and Anthony included
warranties of title, or whether Mary Jo and Anthony were purchasers for a valuable
consideration.
Although not stated in the judgment, Mark Nelson and Jo Marie Nelson are assumed
to be husband and wife.
Nelson (n 13) 336. It is not indicated whether the deed to the Nelsons included
warranties of title.
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and the Salituros, joint claimants of an undivided one-quarter interest in fee as heirs
of their father George.20 Concluding that Mary Jo and Anthony had extinguished the
Salituros’ interest by adverse possession prior to 1997, the District Court granted
summary judgment in favour of the Nelsons and quieted title in them, except for the
one-half interest in the mineral estate reserved by Mary Jo and Anthony.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Montana, the Salituros argued that they had
received no notice of any adverse claim and that the acts of the other cotenants
were consistent with their all holding together as tenants in common. In reply, the
Nelsons, and Mary Jo and Anthony, argued that ‘a conveyance of the whole property
to a stranger to the cotenancy, together with taking possession thereof, amounts to
an ouster of one’s cotenants’.21 Montana law on adverse possession, like that in
most American states, requires that an adverse possessor must prove ‘actual, visible,
exclusive, hostile and continuous possession for the full statutory period’.22 In
Montana, the statutory period is five years for an occupant who enters and founds a
claim of title ‘upon a written instrument as being a conveyance of the property’,23
and pays the property taxes.24 A person enters under such a claim if the person
holds the land under ‘any instrument purporting to convey the land or the right to its
possession, provided the claim is made thereunder in good faith’.25
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A quiet title action is an action commenced by a plaintiff against all adverse claimants
to establish title to land. Because few American titles are registered in a Torrens-type
system, the action provides a means to secure a judicial determination of title.
Nelson (n 13) 337.
Ibid, quoting Y A Bar Livestock Co v Harkness, 887 P 2d 1211, 1213 (Mont, 1994)
(‘Y A Bar Livestock Co’). The principles in Australian law are virtually identical,
requiring that the possession be ‘open, not secret; peaceful, not by force; and adverse,
not by consent of the true owner’: Mulcahy v Curramore Pty Ltd [1974] 2 NSWLR
464, 475 (Bowen CJ in Eq). See also Re Riley and the Real Property Act [1965]
NSWR 994; Harris v Wogama Pty Ltd [1969] 1 NSWR 245; Solling v Broughton
[1893] AC 556; Cawthorne v Thomas (1993) 6 BPR 97,515.
Mont Code Ann § 70-19-407 (LexisNexis 2019). Such a written instrument is
commonly said to give the claimant color of title. ‘[Color of title is created by] a title
that is imperfect, but not so obviously so that it would be apparent to one not skilled in
the law’: Nelson (n 13) 338, quoting Y A Bar Livestock Co (n 22) 1216 (alterations
in original).
Mont Code Ann § 70-19-411 (LexisNexis 2019). Different limitation periods exist in
each Australian state and territory. An excellent summary of each is found in Robina
Kidd et al, ‘Overview — Possessory Title’, LexisNexis Practical Guidance (Web Page,
2019) <http://lexisweb.lexisnexis.com.au/Practical-Guidance-Topic.aspx?tid=1094>.
In South Australia, for instance, claims for recovery of land must be made within
15 years after the right of action has accrued: Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) s 4.
Nelson (n 13) 337, quoting Fitschen Bros Commercial Co v Noyes’ Estate, 246 P
773, 779 (Mont, 1926) (‘Fitschen Bros Commercial Co’). The Court created some
confusion when, later in the opinion, it stated that the deed from Angelo and Josephine
gave Mary Jo and Anthony color of title ‘because the deed purported to convey the
entirety of the Property, was not void on its face, and was made in good faith’: Nelson
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Although traditionally ouster required notice to the other cotenant that the possessor
was claiming an interest ‘hostile and adverse to the fellow cotenant’s interest’,26
a prior Montana judicial decision held that possession under a deed purporting
to convey the entire property is hostile to another cotenant who is ‘charged with
knowledge of the hostile character thereof’.27 Affirming the District Court’s ruling
in favour of Mary Jo and Anthony, the Supreme Court held that ‘[t]heir entry under
color of title constitutes ouster’.28
Although the Court did not use the term in referring to the ouster, it would normally
be described as ‘constructive ouster’, just as the notice charged to the Salituros
would be described as ‘constructive notice’.29 For the statute of limitations to perform
its title-clearing function in cases of cotenancies, there must be an ouster to begin its
running. The ouster, whether actual or constructive as in this case, is the moment
when the cause of action for possession accrues. Qualifying ouster and notice as
‘constructive’ is merely a legal fiction to reconcile the rules of cotenancies with a
result the Court finds just under all the circumstances.30
It is unclear what weight the Court attached to recordation in this case. While in its
statement of facts the Court mentioned that the public records in the county ‘included
an affidavit of heirship from Angelo purporting to account for all Bisceglia heirs’,31
only in the penultimate paragraph of the opinion did the Court add that the record
also included the deed from Angelo and Josephine to Mary Jo and Anthony. And
only in the last paragraph did the Court state that because Mary Jo and Anthony had
‘entered under a recorded deed that purported to convey to them the entirety of the
Property, Davis and Palese’s [Mary Jo and Anthony’s] initial entry of the Property was
“obviously consistent with the disclaimer and disavowal of other tenants’ interests”’
that is required for ouster.32 Further complicating the issue is the Court’s statement
in a footnote that its holding was ‘consistent with the clear weight of authority that
ouster occurs when one cotenant purports to convey the entire property to a party

26
27
28

29

30
31
32

(n 13) 338. The proper test seems to be whether the grantees (Mary Jo and Anthony)
took title in good faith, not whether the grantors (Angelo and Josephine) conveyed the
property in good faith.
Ibid 337, citing Y A Bar Livestock Co (n 22) 1214–15.
Ibid, quoting Fitschen Bros Commercial Co (n 25) 780.
Ibid 339. Because the Court held that ‘[w]hen Davis and Palese conveyed the Property
to the Nelsons in 1997, the Salituros’ interests in the Property already had been extinguished’, there was no need to discuss adverse possession of the mineral estate: at 339.
The only mention of constructive knowledge in the opinion was the finding that Mary
Jo and Anthony had ‘no actual or constructive knowledge that they were cotenants
with anyone’: ibid 338.
On the use of legal fictions in property law: see John V Orth, Reappraisals in the Law
of Property (Taylor & Francis, 2010) 105–15.
Nelson (n 13) 338.
Ibid 339, quoting Fitschen Bros Commercial Co (n 25) 779. Of course, had Angelo
and Josephine not conveyed to Mary Jo and Anthony, there would have been no deed
of record but only the affidavit of heirship.
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that was not previously a cotenant, a deed of transfer is recorded, and the transferee
takes possession of the property’.33
It is difficult to see what the Salituros should have done to get actual notice of the
‘disclaimer and disavowal’ of their interest. Even if they had learned of their father’s
intestate succession to a one-quarter interest in the property, which passed to them
on his death, observation of their cotenants’ occupancy would not necessarily have
put them on notice that their cotenants were claiming sole ownership of the entire
estate. As the Court recognised, ‘many of the acts upon which Mary Jo and Anthony
rely to demonstrate possession and occupation would be consistent with holding an
interest in a cotenancy if Mary Jo and Anthony’s interest were not hostile’.34 And it
would be inconsistent with the usual effect attributed to recordation to charge the
Salituros with record notice of the hostile claim. Although it is sometimes said that
recording a deed gives constructive notice to all the world, it is generally recognised
that it is ‘constructive notice only to those who are bound to search for it: [such as]
subsequent purchasers and mortgagees, and perhaps all others who deal with or on
the credit of the title’;35 a category of persons that does not include cotenants.

IV C onclusion
To a great extent, the doctrine of indefeasibility eliminates many common law
principles relating to possessory title to land. In the initial period following the introduction of Torrens title in Australia, it was thought that adverse possession was one
of those vestiges of the common law that would disappear with the operation of title
by registration. That has not been the case, with all Australian jurisdictions either
retaining, or reintroducing in statutory form, the operation of adverse possession.
Questions remain unanswered, including those raised by the facts in Nelson. As
such, the decision of the Supreme Court of Montana proves instructive not only for
American law, but Australian too.

33

34

35

Ibid 338 n 2 (emphasis added). The Court cited nine cases from other jurisdictions.
‘A minority of jurisdictions hold that a deed purporting to transfer the entire estate
to a non-cotenant party does not meet the requirements of ouster’: at 338 n 2, citing
Johnson v McLamb, 101 SE 2d 311 (NC, 1958).
Ibid 339. The fact that Mary Jo and Anthony paid the property taxes is not itself
conclusive of their adverse claim since tax-paying cotenants are entitled to demand
contribution from the other cotenants. See David A Thomas (ed), Thompson on Real
Property (LexisNexis, 2nd ed, 2004) vol 4, § 31.07(b).
Maul v Rider, 59 Pa 167, 171 (1868).

